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Abstract
This paper analyzes the sources of labor share variations and its general downward
trend, observed recently in most European economies. Using a unique quarterly ﬁrm-
level panel dataset from the Polish enterprise sector in the period 1995–2008, we
quantify the impacts on the observed variation in labor shares of (i) ﬁrms’ “demo-
graphics” including ﬁrms’ age as well as their entry and exit behavior, (ii) selected
labor market characteristics such as newly ﬁlled vacancies, labor market tightness,
and human capital measures, (iii) ﬁrm- and sector-level measures of export intensity,
competition, and ownership structure, and (iv) shifts in the sectoral make-up of GDP.
We also test the potential cross-eﬀects among these variables. We conclude that while
sector-speciﬁc factors, changes in the ownership structure, and the accumulation of
human capital explain a large fraction of the observed downward trend in the la-
bor share, labor market characteristics, market structures and ﬁrm demographics are
robust correlates of labor share changes at high frequency.
Keywords and Phrases: labor share, ﬁrm-level data, sectoral composition, labor
market tightness, ﬁrm demographics
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D33, E25
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Non-technical summary
Non-technical summary
Since 1995, when reliable data on GDP and its components became ﬁrst available, we
observe in Poland that labor productivity rises generally faster than average wages,
thus producing a downward trend in the labor income share (see e.g. Kolasa, 2008;
Growiec, 2009). The fall of the labor share is also subject to cyclical ﬂuctuations, and
there have been a few short-lived reversals of the trend, but the ﬁnding is nevertheless
striking, given the fact that throughout the period, Polish labor shares were one of
the lowest among European (modern EU) countries already back in 1995.
This ﬁnding for Poland parallels similar downfalls in the labor share observed in
developed countries, in particular in most EU countries (though not so much in the
US), which have been recently analyzed and explained by diverse means (Bernanke
and G¨ urkaynak, 2001; Bentolila and St. Paul, 2003; Timmer et al., 2003; Arpaia et
al., 2009; Genre et al., 2009; OECD, 2009). It is however not at all in agreement with
previous, essentially trendless variations of the labor share in earlier post-war decades
(Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak, 2001; Gollin, 2002), and neither does it accord with the
usual macroeconomic paradigm, based on Cobb–Douglas production functions, cou-
pled with isoelastic demand curves, leading to constant monopolistic markups over
marginal costs, and leaving no room for trending labor shares.
Given this background, the objective of the current paper is to quantify the im-
portance of selected economic mechanisms in shaping the labor income share. We
shall take advantage of our unique quarterly panel dataset of individual enterprises,
from Poland in 1995–2008, and pursue an empirical analysis of four competing driving
forces behind the observed labor share movements: (i) ﬁrms’“demographics”including
ﬁrms’ age as well as their entry and exit behavior – interacting with investment-speciﬁc
technical change; (ii) selected labor market characteristics such as newly ﬁlled vacan-
cies, labor market tightness, and human capital measures, (iii) ﬁrm- and sector-level
measures of export intensity, competition, and ownership structure, and (iv) shifts in
the sectoral make-up of Polish GDP – as there are inherent intersectoral diﬀerences
in labor shares. We shall also check what happens if these mechanisms are included
jointly, as there might be some interdependence between them (e.g., there should be
more ﬁrm turnover in more competitive sectors, etc.)
The task undertaken here is complementary to the one discussed in Growiec
(2009), where the aggregate shift in the labor share in Poland has been decomposed
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into contributions attributable to inter-sectoral reallocation of production, asymmet-
ric changes in wages, and intra-sectoral shifts in the labor share. The results of that
study indicated that around 44% of the total shift in labor share could be attributed
to inter-sectoral reallocation, but almost no variance could. Here, in contrast, we
scrutinize the intra-sectoral shifts in more detail, identifying the impacts of changes
in general labor market characteristics, ﬁrm demographics, market structures, and
human capital variables. Our dataset enables us to draw precise conclusions on the
relative importance of particular variables in explaining the variability of labor shares
across ﬁrms and time.
We conclude that while sector-speciﬁc factors and changes in the ownership struc-
ture explain a large fraction of the observed downward trend in the labor share, labor
market characteristics and ﬁrm demographics are robust correlates of labor share
changes at high frequency. Our results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies
in the regressions beside ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and to allowing for autocorrelation of the
disturbance term. They are therefore not driven by cross-correlations across the busi-
ness cycle, nor are they artifacts of the construction of our dataset. Instead, we can
conﬁdently claim that we have identiﬁed genuine determinants of the labor share
across enterprises.
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1 Introduction
Since 1995, when reliable data on GDP and its components became ﬁrst available, we
observe in Poland that labor productivity rises generally faster than average wages,
thus producing a downward trend in the labor income share (Kolasa, 2008; Growiec,
2009). The fall of the labor share is also subject to cyclical ﬂuctuations, and there
have been a few short-lived reversals of the trend, but the ﬁnding is nevertheless
striking, given the fact that throughout the period, Polish labor shares were one of
the lowest among European (modern EU) countries already back in 1995 (cf. OECD,
2009).
This ﬁnding for Poland parallels similar downfalls in the labor share observed in
developed countries, in particular in most EU countries (though not so much in the
US), which have been recently analyzed and explained by diverse means (Bernanke
and G¨ urkaynak, 2001; Bentolila and St. Paul, 2003; Timmer et al., 2003; Arpaia et
al., 2009; Genre et al., 2009; OECD, 2009). It is however not at all in agreement with
previous, essentially trendless variations of the labor share in earlier post-war decades
(Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak, 2001; Gollin, 2002), and neither does it accord with the
usual macroeconomic paradigm, based on Cobb–Douglas production functions, cou-
pled with isoelastic demand curves, leading to constant monopolistic markups over
marginal costs.
Since under Cobb–Douglas technology and constant markups, there is no room for
trending labor shares,1 the literature tried to explain this phenomenon as departures
from that convenient benchmark. In that respect, Bentolila and St. Paul (2003)
as well as Arpaia et al. (2009) explored departures from Cobb–Douglas technology.
Arpaia et al. (2009) proposed to use a nested CES speciﬁcation with physical capital
as well as skilled and unskilled labor, oﬀering a closed-form solution for the labor
share as a function of factor stocks and elasticity parameters. Bentolila and St.
Paul (2003) presented a more general proposition which linked the labor share to the
capital–output ratio.
A diﬀerent line of reasoning emphasizes that if the production function is not
1To be more precise: Cobb–Douglas production functions, coupled with isoelastic demand curves,
lead to stationary monopolistic markups over marginal costs. If the considered model includes
stochastic ﬂuctuations, price rigidities, etc., then markups may vary in the short run; in any case,
systematic departures from the deterministic steady-state value are ruled out.
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Cobb–Douglas, then the labor share may shift if there is capital-augmenting (at least,
not purely labor-augmenting) technical change (Bentolila and St. Paul, 2003; Jones,
2005), which is especially vital in the case of investment-speciﬁc technical change (cf.
Gordon, 1990; Whelan, 2003). Empirical evidence suggests that there might be an
important link between these phenomena, as the recent drop in the labor share in
Europe is strongly correlated with the increase in the GDP share of hi-tech, export-
oriented sectors as well as sectors that use ICT as general purpose technology (Timmer
et al., 2003).
A complementary approach has been taken by de Serres et al. (2002), Kyyr¨ a
and Maliranta (2008), Genre et al. (2009) as well as OECD (2009) who applied a
shift-share analysis, decomposing the total shift in the labor share into components
attributable to labor share shifts within sectors of the economy, and the eﬀects of
intersectoral reallocation. Indeed, the aggregate perspective might hide important
micro-level changes, especially if diﬀerent sectors of the economy have diﬀerent rates
of technical change and/or diﬀerent production functions.
Yet another hypothesis relates the shifts in labor shares to changes in labor mar-
ket characteristics such as the relative bargaining power of employers and employees
(Arpaia et al., 2009), labor market tightness (the number of unemployed per vacancy),
and new hires per one unemployed person (Brigden and Thomas, 2003). The crucial
mechanism here is that if wages are not set competitively, or at least with a constant
margin over ﬁrms’ marginal costs, but instead in bargaining processes within labor
markets subject to search-matching frictions, variables related to the current state of
the labor market might have substantial explanatory power, especially when shorter
term movements are concerned. Furthermore, lasting changes in employment policies
might also yield lasting shifts in the labor share.
Moreover, there might also be ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncracies on top of the aforemen-
tioned mechanisms. To capture these, one could track the dependence of labor shares
on ﬁrm size, age, and – to capture ﬁrm turnover – whether the ﬁrm is a start-up or
a quitter (see also Kyyr¨ a and Maliranta, 2008). Firm-level data do not suggest that
start-up ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher or lower labor shares on average, but they do
indicate that the labor share decreases (slowly) with ﬁrm age, even if one controls for
ﬁrm size (which, conditional on survival, generally increases over time, and the labor
share increases with ﬁrm size). If nevertheless being a start-up goes together with a
lower labor share, and being a quitter goes together with a higher labor share, then
9Introduction
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at the aggregate level, these micro-level movements should impose downward trends
in the labor share in periods of increased ﬁrm turnover, and upward trends at less
turbulent times. Hence, ﬁrm demographics should provide a (partial) explanation for
the cyclical movement of the labor share, whereas ampliﬁed technical change might
lower the labor share not only because part of it tends to be capital-augmenting, but
also because it strengthens ﬁrm competition and“creative destruction”.
In Poland, there may also be diﬀerent eﬀects on top of the above generic ﬁndings,
because Poland is a transition economy, undergoing restructuring, transformation,
changes in ownership structure, and real convergence with the EU. In the period since
1995, for which we have reliable data, the Polish economy has also beneﬁted largely
from international technology transfer (Kolasa, 2008), partially thanks to foreign
direct investment (Olszewski, 2009).
Given this background, the objective of the current paper is to quantify the impor-
tance of all aforementioned mechanisms in shaping the labor income share. We shall
take advantage of our unique quarterly panel dataset of individual enterprises (from
Poland in 1995–2008) and pursue an empirical analysis of four competing driving
forces behind the observed labor share movements: (i) ﬁrms’ “demographics” includ-
ing ﬁrms’ age as well as their entry and exit behavior – interacting with investment-
speciﬁc technical change; (ii) selected labor market characteristics such as newly ﬁlled
vacancies, labor market tightness, and human capital measures, (iii) ﬁrm- and sector-
level measures of export intensity, competition, and ownership structure, and (iv)
shifts in the sectoral make-up of Polish GDP – as there are inherent intersectoral
diﬀerences in labor shares. We shall also check what happens if these mechanisms are
included jointly, as there might be some interdependence between them (e.g., there
should be more ﬁrm turnover in more competitive sectors, etc.)
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the broad
patterns of labor share dynamics in Poland. Section 3.1 discusses the sources of data
used in subsequent analysis. Section 3.2 concentrates on sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences in
labor shares and their potential in explaining the changes in aggregate labor income
share. Section 3.3 turns to the labor share impact of entry and exit dynamics. Sec-
tion 3.4 deals with labor market characteristics. Section 3.5 is dedicated to market
structures, and it aims to disentangle the impacts of several measures of capital in-
tensity and competition on the labor share. Section 4 puts all these eﬀects together
and presents our principal regression results. Section 5 concludes.
10Introduction
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2 Dynamics of the labor share
In the period 1995–2008, average wages in Poland were rising much more slowly than
labor productivity (i.e., value added per worker),2 parallel to similar developments
in numerous other developed and transition countries, in particular in the European
Union (cf. Timmer et al., 2003; OECD, 2009). The tendency was however subject to
additional ﬂuctuations on top of that (see Fig. 1). In Poland, the largest disparity
between the two dynamics was observed in 2001–2004. In periods 1995–96 and 2007–
08, reversals in this tendency were observed, though. Throughout 1995–2008, labor
productivity in the analyzed group of enterprises increased by 309% and mean wage
increased by 256%. Total employment in the analyzed group of enterprises ﬁrst fell,
from about 4.3 million workers in 1995 to about 3.4 million in 2002, and then rose
again, reaching about 4.1 million employed in 2008.
In consequence, the labor share (i.e., the ratio of gross remuneration of employees,
including the tax wedge on labor, to total value added) fell considerably. Figure
2 illustrates this phenomenon with the distinction of industry, services, as well as
tradables and nontradables sectors. It turns out that the shifts in the labor share
aligned with the underlying business cycle, and were recorded by all sectors of the
economy almost symmetrically. All sectors felt the drop in labor shares most strongly
in 2001–04.
A study by Growiec (2009), closely related to the current one, proceeded to disen-
tangle intrasectoral shifts in the labor share from shifts in the aggregate labor share
attributable to intersectoral reallocation. The unit of observation in that study was a
two-digit NACE sector. Perhaps the most striking result of that study is that while
some 44% of the total change in labor share throughout the period can be explained
by intersectoral components, almost none of its variance could. Reallocation eﬀects –
spanning from ﬂows of capital and labor across sectors, to the eﬀects of selective re-
structuring, tilting wage distributions across sectors, and to diﬀerential, sector-speciﬁc
productivity growth rates – are much less volatile and hardly correlated with overall
labor share shifts at all; they however preserve the same direction of impact, i.e. they
2Generally, throughout the whole article, we are preoccupied with productivity per worker, not
per hour worked. Of course, it would be interesting to know the latter measure as well, since hours
worked per person may vary largely across ﬁrms, sectors, and time. Such information is not available
in our ﬁrm-level dataset, though, so we are forced to stick to per worker units.
11
2 Dynamics of the labor share
In the period 1995–2008, average wages in Poland were rising much more slowly than
labor productivity (i.e., value added per worker),2 parallel to similar developments
in numerous other developed and transition countries, in particular in the European
Union (cf. Timmer et al., 2003; OECD, 2009). The tendency was however subject to
additional ﬂuctuations on top of that (see Fig. 1). In Poland, the largest disparity
between the two dynamics was observed in 2001–2004. In periods 1995–96 and 2007–
08, reversals in this tendency were observed, though. Throughout 1995–2008, labor
productivity in the analyzed group of enterprises increased by 309% and mean wage
increased by 256%. Total employment in the analyzed group of enterprises ﬁrst fell,
from about 4.3 million workers in 1995 to about 3.4 million in 2002, and then rose
again, reaching about 4.1 million employed in 2008.
In consequence, the labor share (i.e., the ratio of gross remuneration of employees,
including the tax wedge on labor, to total value added) fell considerably. Figure
2 illustrates this phenomenon with the distinction of industry, services, as well as
tradables and nontradables sectors. It turns out that the shifts in the labor share
aligned with the underlying business cycle, and were recorded by all sectors of the
economy almost symmetrically. All sectors felt the drop in labor shares most strongly
in 2001–04.
A study by Growiec (2009), closely related to the current one, proceeded to disen-
tangle intrasectoral shifts in the labor share from shifts in the aggregate labor share
attributable to intersectoral reallocation. The unit of observation in that study was a
two-digit NACE sector. Perhaps the most striking result of that study is that while
some 44% of the total change in labor share throughout the period can be explained
by intersectoral components, almost none of its variance could. Reallocation eﬀects –
spanning from ﬂows of capital and labor across sectors, to the eﬀects of selective re-
structuring, tilting wage distributions across sectors, and to diﬀerential, sector-speciﬁc
productivity growth rates – are much less volatile and hardly correlated with overall
labor share shifts at all; they however preserve the same direction of impact, i.e. they
2Generally, throughout the whole article, we are preoccupied with productivity per worker, not
per hour worked. Of course, it would be interesting to know the latter measure as well, since hours
worked per person may vary largely across ﬁrms, sectors, and time. Such information is not available
in our ﬁrm-level dataset, though, so we are forced to stick to per worker units.
11



























































Labor productivity Wages Employment (right axis)
Source: own computations based on ﬁrm-level F-01 data (GUS).
too shift labor shares downward. Some illustrative results of that study are quoted
in Table 1.
Table 1: Contributions of intra- and intersectoral shifts to the total 1995–2008 drop
in the labor share in Poland.
1995–2008 In % Variance In %
Intra-sectoral shifts -0,0393 55,7470 0,0010459 96,09
Asymm. wage changes -0,0199 28,2351 0,0000061 -0,83
Changes in GDP share -0,0113 16,0179 0,0000479 4,74
Total -0,0705 100 0,0010874 100
Source: Growiec (2009).
Despite the intuitive appeal of the results presented in Table 1, they in fact conceal
substantial heterogeneity across certain sections of the Polish economy. This is clearly
visible in Tables 2–3, providing the results of analogous studies conducted on subsets
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of sectors. Table 2 decomposes shifts in the labor share within groups of sectors in the
1995–2008 period into the three aforementioned components, whereas Table 3 breaks
down their variance. The rows of these two tables denote, respectively:
1. ∆
wiLi
Yi – intra-sectoral shifts in the labor share.
2. ∆
wi
w – asymmetric wage changes across sectors.
3. ∆
Yi
Y – changes in sectoral shares of total value added.
What is particularly interesting in Table 2 is that for subsets of sectors, the compo-
nents attributable to changes in the sectoral make-up of GDP are large in magnitude,
but strongly asymmetric between tradables and nontradables and between manufac-
turing and services. These “reallocation and diﬀerential growth rates” eﬀects exert
a strong pressure towards a decrease in labor shares in tradables, mining and man-
ufacturing, but they push towards an increase in labor shares in nontradables and
services. The impact of these eﬀects on the labor share in the total economy is small
only due to their opposing directions of inﬂuence across large sections of the economy.
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This ﬁnding stretches further into the analysis of variance. In Table 3, we see that
– as opposed to total eﬀects presented in Table 1 – intersectoral reallocation eﬀects do
play an important role in explaining the variance of labor shares in selected sections
of the economy. Again, it is especially so in the case of the third component (changes
in sectoral shares of total value added).
Table 2: Decomposing total shifts in the labor share in 1995–2008 into three compo-
nents: grouping sectors.
Export-oriented Non-export-oriented Tradables Nontradables
Sum In % Sum In % Sum In % Sum In %
∆
wiLi
Yi 0,027 -18,72 -0,059 125,66 0,010 -7,68 -0,095 –
∆
wi
w 0,003 -1,94 -0,027 57,10 -0,006 4,49 -0,034 –
∆
Yi
Y -0,175 120,66 0,039 -82,76 -0,138 103,19 0,133 –
Total -0,145 100 -0,047 100 -0,134 100 0,005 100
Mining sector Manufacturing Services
Sum In % Sum In % Sum In %
∆
wiLi
Yi -0,079 18,17 -0,013 8,94 -0,080 -83,67
∆
wi
w 0,027 -6,20 -0,020 13,77 -0,026 -26,99
∆
Yi
Y -0,381 88,02 -0,112 77,29 0,200 210,66
Total -0,433 100 -0,145 100 0,095 100
Source: Growiec (2009).
Notes: in the case of nontradables, the total change in the labor share was close to zero, and thus computing percentage
contributions made no sense. In the case of services, the percentage contributions of negative components are negative
even though they worked along the general trend of labor share decrease. Export-oriented sectors are deﬁned as sectors
with more than 20% of revenues from exports; sectors producing tradables are deﬁned as sectors with more than 5%
of revenues from exports.
In conclusion, intersectoral components provide almost no insight into short-run
ﬂuctuations of the aggregate labor income share, and only a partial explanation to
the observed downward trend over the longer run. Disaggregating this result provides
some new insights: some intersectoral eﬀects might be large in magnitude but oﬀset
themselves because of having opposite impacts on selected sections of the economy.
The results of such exercise are nevertheless still unsatisfactory as a ﬁnal explanation
of the dynamics of the labor share. This is why we think it is crucial to analyze the
data further, and test alternative theories which could explain the observed devel-
14
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Table 3: Variance decomposition of labor share shifts: grouping sectors
Export-oriented Non-export oriented Tradables Nontradables
σ2 In % σ2 In % σ2 In % σ2 In %
∆
wiLi
Yi 0,0030 146,74 0,0008 73,14 0,0016 109,88 0,0007 58,70
∆
wi
w 0,0001 0,88 0,0000 -1,70 0,0000 -5,42 0,0000 4,04
∆
Yi
Y 0,0014 -17,25 0,0002 26,61 0,0004 1,94 0,0004 35,84
σ2(X) 0,0009 100 0,0013 100 0,0011 100 0,0014 100
Mining sector Manufacturing Services
σ2 In % σ2 In % σ2 In %
∆
wiLi
Yi 0,0025 35,88 0,0009 78,87 0,0014 57,17
∆
wi
w 0,0003 1,49 0,0000 1,06 0,0001 -12,52
∆
Yi
Y 0,0035 79,79 0,0003 20,79 0,0016 57,82
σ2(X) 0,0020 100 0,0011 100 0,0023 100
Source: Growiec (2009).
Notes: in the row σ2(X) we presented the total variance of labor share shifts in each particular sector. Percentage
contributions include covariances between the components. The values do not sum up to 100%, because this is just a
fragmentary view of a decomposition exercise conducted for the whole economy. Export-oriented sectors are deﬁned
as sectors with more than 20% of revenues from exports; sectors producing tradables are deﬁned as sectors with more
than 5% of revenues from exports. See Growiec (2009) for details.
opments in the labor share at middle-to-high frequencies. A further reason is that
sector-level data, analyzed by Growiec (2009), might conceal certain regularities which
might turn out to be visible when ﬁrm-level data are analyzed.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
The data used herein are ﬁrm-level data from ﬁnancial reports of enterprises in Poland,
collected by the Polish Statistical Oﬃce (G l´ owny Urz  ad Statystyczny, GUS), the so-
called F-01 forms. These reports are handed in by all ﬁrms employing at least 50
persons, with the exception of the agricultural sector (NACE 1-2),3 ﬁnancial inter-
mediation sector (NACE 65), insurance and pension funds (NACE 66), auxiliary
activities related to ﬁnance and insurance (NACE 67), households employing workers
3Throughout the article, the abbreviation NACE refers to NACE Rev. 1.1.
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(NACE 95), and extra-territorial organizations (NACE 99). The sample covers the
period 1995–2008, with quarterly frequency. We are not aware of any other dataset
which would both have a quarterly frequency and full coverage of all eligible individ-
ual ﬁrms in the economy. This underlies the uniqueness of this dataset in providing
the crucial insights with respect to ﬁrm-level determinants of the labor share along
the business cycle. The total number of observations is around 660,000; the sample
consists of 35,270 individual ﬁrms.
It should be emphasized that due to data availability, several sectors of the econ-
omy are either excluded or under-represented. This applies in particular to sectors
dominated by enterprises below 50 employees, such as many services and nontradable
goods sectors. On the other hand, restricting the sample to such ﬁrms helps avoid
methodological problems related to the need for dividing mixed incomes of the self-
employed into remuneration of labor and capital. It cannot, however, help avoid the
fact that a fraction of employee compensation might be hidden in the“subcontracting”
(outside services) category, or outsourcing of labor, which is treated as remuneration
of capital, if the subcontractor is e.g. self-employed. Unfortunately, one cannot judge
the extent to which this might bias our results.
These eﬀects, taken together, lead to a systematic underestimation of the labor
share in the total economy (see the discussion in OECD, 2009). In the case of Poland,
as is visible in Figure 3, the labor share in the total economy, as reported in the OECD
STAN database, is on average 8.4 percentage points higher than the one following from
micro-level entrerprise (F-01) data. Moreover, the labor share fell more sharply in
the enterprise sector, especially between 2001 and 2004. OECD attributes the visible
increase in the diﬀerence between the labor shares in the non-agricultural enterprise
sector to a continued reallocation of workers from industry to services and a marked
increase in agricultural labor income share (OECD, 2009).
As far as auxiliary data sources are concerned, the data dealing with skill dis-
tributions within sectors of the economy have been obtained from the EU KLEMS
database. These are three variables, summing up to 100%: high-skilled, medium-
skilled, and low-skilled labor compensation as a share in total labor compensation.
Time series on the number of vacancies, total unemployment, and jobs found, used to
compute our measures of labor market tightness and hire ratio, come from the Polish
Statistical Oﬃce (GUS).
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sector to a continued reallocation of workers from industry to services and a marked
increase in agricultural labor income share (OECD, 2009).
As far as auxiliary data sources are concerned, the data dealing with skill dis-
tributions within sectors of the economy have been obtained from the EU KLEMS
database. These are three variables, summing up to 100%: high-skilled, medium-
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3.2 Sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences
As we have seen in Figure 2, labor shares have declined throughout the sectors of
Polish economy in a rather uniform fashion. In consequence, the intersectoral dis-
persion of labor shares was pretty much preserved. However, their distribution (see
Figure 4 and Table 4) has substantial variance and is skewed to the right. Sectoral
average labor shares vary from as much as 70–74% in the cases of Health and Social
Care (NACE 85), Science and R&D (NACE 73), Coal Mining (NACE 10), and Other
Service Activities (NACE 93), to 5–6% in the cases of the Tobacco industry (NACE
16) and Coke and Oil Reﬁning (NACE 23).
Hence, it seems that sector-speciﬁc eﬀects alone can explain a large share of the
cross-sectional varation in labor shares. Since they are ﬁxed over time, however, they
are useless for explaining the dynamics of the aggregate labor share, unless signiﬁcant
reallocation of resources between sectors is observed. This has already been shown
by Growiec (2009), however, to explain a relatively small fraction of the total shift
in labor share in Poland, and none of its short-run dynamics. Furthermore, the
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Source: own computations based on F-01 (GUS) data.
Note: we dropped the following sectors due to insuﬃcient data: Oil and Gas Mining (NACE 11), Mining of Metal
Ores (NACE 13), Air Transport (NACE 62), and Other Membership Organizations (NACE 91).
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the distribution of average labor shares across sectors
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intersectoral variation in labor shares can often be driven down to diﬀerences in more
fundamental characteristics of the sectors, such as exposure to international trade,
competitiveness, capital intensity, or ownership structure.4
4Even when these measurable diﬀerences across sectors and ﬁrms are accounted for, there however
still remain statistically signiﬁcant sector-specﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, capturing some latent characteristics of
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3.3 Firm demographics: ﬁrm age, entry and exit
Our ﬁrm-level data are also a useful tool for disentangling macro-level reallocation
and convergence eﬀects from micro-level, “ﬁrm demographics” eﬀects involving ﬁrm
entry and exit. At face value, these eﬀects do not seem strong in the light of the
fact that average (employment-weighted) labor shares in both entering and exiting
ﬁrms have fallen slightly throughout the analyzed period (cf. Figure 5) – linear
trend lines are basically ﬂat and almost entirely overlapping – and that no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between these two mean values could be seen throughout the period 1996–
2008. Hence, one may expect no signiﬁcant labor share eﬀects from the side of ﬁrm
demographics.
On the other hand, it is possible that there exist other factors which make ﬁrms
enter or exit the sample,5 such as market competitiveness, ﬁrm eﬃciency, export
intensity, exiting ﬁrms being endowed with inferior or obsolete technology, etc. In
principle, these factors might also be correlated with labor share. In such case, we
will observe diﬀerent labor share eﬀects from ﬁrm demographics once these interfer-
ing mechanisms are controlled for. If nevertheless quitting ﬁrms have, conditional on
these factors, higher labor shares than the entrants, then we should expect ﬁrm de-
mographics to exert a robust impact on the labor share, lowering it in periods of high
ﬁrm turnover, such as downturns and crises, and increasing it in periods of relative
stability.
Furthermore, a simple computation of conditional means shows that labor share
decreases with ﬁrm age but increases with ﬁrm size. However, average size is positively
correlated with age, and by construction of the dataset, average age within our dataset
increases with time (we have no means for controlling ﬁrm age prior to 1995, so in
this exercise we only include those who entered the sample after 1995Q1).
the underlying technology and markets. This has been conﬁrmed in a series of auxiliary regressions,
available upon request.
5Please note that ﬁrms may enter our sample in two ways. First, they can be start-ups with
more than 50 employees from the very beginning; second, they can also be ﬁrms which had existed
before actually entering the sample, but they were included in it only at the moment when their
size exceeded the threshold of 50 employees. There is no way to distinguish between these two
alternatives so we have to treat them jointly.
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Source: own computations based on F-01 (GUS) data.
3.4 Labor market characteristics
A further group of potential determinants of the labor share at ﬁrm level relates to
the overall labor market outlook of the economy. Within the business cycle, variables
such as the unemployment rate, number of vacancies, and the number of new hires,
ﬂuctuate a lot, and might be relevant for the determination of the short-run dynamics
of ﬁrm-level labor shares. As we see in Figure 6, the years 2001–04 which have
witnessed the strongest fall in the labor share throughout the economy, have been
preceeded by a visible rise of labor market tightness (i.e. the number of unemployed
people per one vacancy, U/V ), and then accompanied by a consecutive fall in this
variable and a rise in the hire ratio (the number of new hires per one unemployed
person). Even though this might not be perfectly visible in Figure 6 to the naked eye,
we shall ﬁnd shortly that the interrelation between these three variables is actually
instantaneous, strong, and robust to controlling for a wide range of other variables.6
6What remains hidden beneath Figure 6 is the accompanying fall in labor market participation.
During 2000–04, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, many persons shifted from employment or
unemployment to professional inactivity, in large part via early retirement. This movement lowered
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Source: own computations based on F-01 (GUS) data.
3.4 Labor market characteristics
A further group of potential determinants of the labor share at ﬁrm level relates to
the overall labor market outlook of the economy. Within the business cycle, variables
such as the unemployment rate, number of vacancies, and the number of new hires,
ﬂuctuate a lot, and might be relevant for the determination of the short-run dynamics
of ﬁrm-level labor shares. As we see in Figure 6, the years 2001–04 which have
witnessed the strongest fall in the labor share throughout the economy, have been
preceeded by a visible rise of labor market tightness (i.e. the number of unemployed
people per one vacancy, U/V ), and then accompanied by a consecutive fall in this
variable and a rise in the hire ratio (the number of new hires per one unemployed
person). Even though this might not be perfectly visible in Figure 6 to the naked eye,
we shall ﬁnd shortly that the interrelation between these three variables is actually
instantaneous, strong, and robust to controlling for a wide range of other variables.6
6What remains hidden beneath Figure 6 is the accompanying fall in labor market participation.
During 2000–04, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, many persons shifted from employment or
unemployment to professional inactivity, in large part via early retirement. This movement lowered
20
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A simple rationale behind a hypothesized causal link between labor market charac-
teristics and the labor share of GDP, partly consistent with this preliminary evidence,
is that in periods of high labor market tightness – and thus low bargaining power of
the workers – it is easier for ﬁrms to lower wages, or at least raise them less than
proportionally to rising productivity. This causes the aggregate labor share to fall.
In periods when the labor market is not tight and it is diﬃcult for ﬁrms to replace
workers, it is also more diﬃcult for them to underpay them. Moreover, a low hire
ratio suggests either a high bargaining power of incumbent workers, usually going
toghether with a high labor share, or a low level of general economic activity (e.g. a
recession). Consequently, in the revival period the hire ratio should rise. Whether it is
followed by a fall in the labor share, it depends on the pace of underlying productivity
growth.











































































































































































labor market tightness (x100) new matches labor share (right axis)
Source: own computations based on GUS data.
Unfortunately, there are no ﬁrm-level, or even industry-level indicators of unem-
ployment and vacancies. Hence, these variables can only be included in the analysis
as aggregates, with no cross-sectional variation.
unemployment, and thus also lowered labor market tightness.
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A diﬀerent story could be told with respect to the human capital endowment
of workers within diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Other things equal, a higher
share of labor compensation going to high- or medium-skilled workers can be a factor
leading to a higher labor share, since their remuneration is generally higher. On the
other hand, since skills are usually complementary to more eﬃcient, capital-intensive
technologies, a higher share of skilled workers might signal technological superiority,
which nowadays – in the times of fast progress in ICT technologies and robotics –
usually goes together with a lower labor share. As we will see soon, our data conﬁrm
the second hypothesis.
3.5 Market structures and ﬁrm ownership
Market structures can inﬂuence labor shares in multiple ways. First of all, there are
important intersectoral diﬀerences with regards to market concentration (measured
e.g. by the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index),7 openness to international trade, ownership
structure, received external donations per unit of value added, and the sector-speciﬁc
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restructuring, real convergence with the EU, privatization, inﬂows of FDI, consec-
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trade. Some sectors have participated in this change, whereas some remained almost
unaﬀected. It is therefore important to include in the regressions variables capturing
market structures at the sectoral level as important potential determinants of the
7The Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index, apart from being a measure of market concentration, can
also be viewed as a proxy measure of competitiveness of a sector. An alternative proxy measure of
competitiveness of a sector is the Lerner index, deﬁned as 1−TC/TR, where TC is total costs and
TR is total revenues within the sector. However, empirical results of the current study obtained
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and/or collinearity problems. Finally, one could also estimate sector-speciﬁc markups directly, which
– for Polish data – has been done by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2007). An instructive corollary
from their study is that they did not ﬁnd any clear-cut positive correlation between their estimated
markups and the Herﬁndahl index. This led them to the conclusion that intersectoral heterogeneity
of markups may result from other factors (level of product diﬀerentiation, price regulations, etc.)
which are not included in indices of concentration.
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A diﬀerent story could be told with respect to the human capital endowment
of workers within diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Other things equal, a higher
share of labor compensation going to high- or medium-skilled workers can be a factor
leading to a higher labor share, since their remuneration is generally higher. On the
other hand, since skills are usually complementary to more eﬃcient, capital-intensive
technologies, a higher share of skilled workers might signal technological superiority,
which nowadays – in the times of fast progress in ICT technologies and robotics –
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labor share.
It should be expected that state-owned enterprises, often running relatively old
vintages of technology, and also having relatively high levels of unionization and
generous remuneration packages, should generally have higher labor shares in value
added than privately owned enterprises. This discrepancy should be even more visible
in the case of foreign owned ﬁrms which, on average, operate better (which often
means: more capital intensive) technologies, are more often export-oriented, operate
in more competitive markets, and have stronger incentives to manage labor costs.
A higher tax wedge on labor income (measured as the ratio of ﬁrms’ labor tax
payments to gross remuneration of their employees) should, on the other hand, go
together with a lower labor share because it provides an incentive to substitute workers
with capital. It also lowers the bargaining position of workers vis ` a vis employers, for
whom total costs of workers’ employment seem very high relative to their productivity.
Furthermore, given the transition and post-transition background in the Polish
enterprise sector, ﬁrms receiving more donations are likely to be those with markedly
higher labor shares, and possibly suﬀering from shortages of up-to-date technology
and a decreasing demand. They are mostly concentrated in service sectors, and are
characterized by particularly high tax wedges on labor.
As far as ﬁrms’ trade openness (measured as a fraction of total revenues coming
from exports) is concerned, it is generally adhered that more export-oriented ﬁrms are
also technologically superior, and operate mostly in capital intensive, manufacturing
sectors. Hence, one should expect ﬁrms’ openness to international trade to go together
with lower labor shares. As our results indicate, however, this is not the case in
Poland. This somewhat surprising ﬁnding can be explained, though, by looking at
the sectoral structure of exports within the Polish economy. Figure 7 illustrates that
in Poland, the labor share of value added and the export revenue share are hardly
correlated at all. Their sector-level correlation coeﬃcient is just 0,08, even though
the most export-oriented sectors, Automobile Industry (NACE 34) and Production of
Radio, TV, and Telecommunications Devices (NACE 32), have below-average labor
shares.
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4 Main results
To quantify the impacts of all aforementioned variables on ﬁrms’ labor shares, we
have run three series of nested, hierarchical regressions. All these regressions, run
to verify the competing hypotheses, have been estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects. This
choice of estimation method was dictated by the results of Hausman tests, according
to which random eﬀects estimators were inconsistent. Furthermore, since random
eﬀects turned out to be highly signiﬁcant, pooled OLS estimators are inappropriate
either, because of the correlation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc observables with the error term. We
also included seasonal dummies to all regressions to capture deterministic seasonal
variation in salaries and (most importantly) value added.
Let us now proceed to the presentation of our principal results.
24Main results
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 2
4






































































































































Mean labor share Trade openness
Source: own computations based on GUS data.
4 Main results
To quantify the impacts of all aforementioned variables on ﬁrms’ labor shares, we
have run three series of nested, hierarchical regressions. All these regressions, run
to verify the competing hypotheses, have been estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects. This
choice of estimation method was dictated by the results of Hausman tests, according
to which random eﬀects estimators were inconsistent. Furthermore, since random
eﬀects turned out to be highly signiﬁcant, pooled OLS estimators are inappropriate
either, because of the correlation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc observables with the error term. We
also included seasonal dummies to all regressions to capture deterministic seasonal
variation in salaries and (most importantly) value added.
Let us now proceed to the presentation of our principal results.
24
4.1 Firm demographics
Our ﬁrst inquiry focused on the impact of ﬁrm demographics on the observed changes
in the labor share. We have run a series of hierarchic regressions, so that we could
test the robustness of the impact on the labor share of our three principal variables:
(i) ﬁrm age, (ii) the entrant dummy, and (iii) the quitter dummy. To have a reliable
dataset, we limited our sample to ﬁrms that entered the sample after 1995Q1, so that
their age could be properly deﬁned. This restricts our sample from about 660,000 to
about 386,000 observations (from about 35,000 to about 25,000 ﬁrms), making our
estimates less reliable than those based on full sample. Proper statistical inference
can still be made nevertheless.
In Table 5 we see that ﬁrm age generally relates negatively to the labor share: older
ﬁrms of the same size tend to have lower labor shares. As is shown in the Appendix,
this result is not robust to the inclusion of time dummies, though: controlling for pure
time eﬀects, ﬁrm age aﬀects the labor share positively, not negatively; controlling for
ﬁrm size as well changes neither of the results.8
It is also found that, controlling for an array of observable characteristics, entrants
tend to have less-than-average labor shares, and quitters tend to have more-than-
average labor shares.9 Hence, periods of higher ﬁrm turnover should be associated
with lower labor shares, if other things are kept equal, in line with intuition. It is
the entrants who are most likely to employ new, more capital-intensive technological
vintages, and the quitters who often operate outdated technology, and thus increased
ﬁrm turnover should also imply more “creative destruction” and adoption of more
capital-intensive production techniques. This fuels consecutive expansions but also
ampliﬁes business cycle ﬂuctuations.
All aforementioned ﬁndings are however not robust to the inclusion of labor mar-
ket characteristics (labor market tightness, new vacancy–employee matches) as control
variables. Once these variables are included as well, the impact of ﬁrm demographics
becomes insigniﬁcant. This result might be due to the cyclical features of ﬁrm demo-
graphics: indeed, ﬁrm turnover is higher in downturns and recessions, and so is labor
market tightness, and new matches move closely against this rule.
8The apparent negative result presented in the main table might thus be spurious and driven
by the simultaneous decline in the labor share and rise in average ﬁrm age in our dataset. See the
Appendix for more details.
9This eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
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The signs of coeﬃcients on control variables are in agreement with intuition and
other empirical evidence. Some of them will be discussed in following subsections.
Table 5: The impact of ﬁrm age, entry and exit on the labor share.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare
quarter 1 0.0347*** 0.0348*** 0.0348*** 0.0348*** 0.0329*** 0.0306***
(0.000715) (0.000715) (0.000715) (0.000715) (0.000704) (0.000712)
quarter 2 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0160*** 0.0473***
(0.000690) (0.000690) (0.000690) (0.000690) (0.000677) (0.001000)
quarter 3 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.00850*** 0.0255***
(0.000682) (0.000682) (0.000682) (0.000681) (0.000668) (0.000819)
ﬁrm age -0.000336*** -0.000334*** -0.000334*** -0.000268*** -0.000414*** 5.29e-06
(2.85e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.88e-05) (2.95e-05) (3.65e-05)
quitter 0.00433*** 0.00436*** 0.00437*** 0.00446*** 0.00684*** 0.00150
(0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00140) (0.00142)
entrant -0.00632*** -0.00628*** -0.00626*** -0.00632*** -0.00444*** 1.96e-06
(0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00109) (0.00117)
ﬁrm size 3.83e-06*** 3.85e-06*** 3.84e-06*** 3.65e-06*** 4.10e-06***
(2.13e-07) (2.13e-07) (2.14e-07) (2.09e-07) (2.33e-07)
mining sector 0.0300** 0.0279* 0.0233 0.0115
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0146)
manufacturing sector 0.000481 1.82e-05 -0.00301 -0.00343
(0.00303) (0.00303) (0.00297) (0.00300)
herﬁndahl (ﬁxed) -0.0911*** -0.0975*** -0.133*** -0.0943***
(0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0271)
trade op. (ﬁxed, sector) 0.0127 0.0140 0.0137 -0.00935
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0108)
treasury owned 0.0350*** 0.0336*** 0.0407***
(0.00348) (0.00340) (0.00355)
state owned 0.0309*** 0.0288*** 0.0289***
(0.00341) (0.00334) (0.00338)
commune owned 0.0703*** 0.0689*** 0.0665***
(0.00729) (0.00712) (0.00726)
foreign owned -0.0183*** -0.0192*** -0.0186***
(0.00255) (0.00250) (0.00251)
donations/VA -0.00224*** 0.0439*** 0.0522***
(0.000304) (0.00417) (0.00436)
trade openness 0.000807 0.000914
(0.000624) (0.000625)
trade openness (sector) 0.00453 0.0269***
(0.00362) (0.00365)








Constant 0.616*** 0.615*** 0.615*** 0.612*** 0.618*** 0.682***
(0.000650) (0.000651) (0.00198) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00286)
Observations 386847 386847 386847 386847 385591 378562
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.016
Number of idn 24998 24998 24998 24998 24920 24440
4.2 Labor market characteristics
We have by now conﬁrmed that, if labor market characteristics are not controlled for,
ﬁrm demographics seem to play an important role in the determination of ﬁrm-level
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labor share. Let us now pass to the discussion of importance and robustness of the
impacts of labor market characteristics – that is, labor market tightness, and newly
ﬁlled vacancies – themselves.
In Table 6 we see that labor market tightness goes together with higher labor
shares, and new matches on the labor market go together with lower labor shares.
This is in line with the intuition which suggests that the labor share should be higher
in periods when the labor market is tight and few new jobs are created: these peri-
ods are also the ones when value added is low and, due to wage rigidities and high
bargaining power of insider employees when ﬁrms face short-term problems, wages do
not follow falling productivity (Blanchard and Katz, 1997). Adding lagged values of
labor market tightness and new matches does not overturn this result. The coeﬃcient
on labor market tightness lagged by one quarter is positive and signiﬁcant, whereas
the coeﬃcient on new matches is negative and signiﬁcant both in the ﬁrst and the
second lag. This corroborates our original ﬁndings, implying that the dynamics on
the labor market should not interfere visibly with other results obtained here. Hence,
this result should be viewed as a robust short-run positive correlation between the
labor share, labor market tightness, and the diﬃculty to form new employer–employee
matches, which is valid irrespective of the choice of control variables, thus supporting
the preliminary evidence presented in Figure 6.
In sum, even when controlling for a wide host of auxiliary variables, both labor
market characteristics turn out to be highly important for the determination of the
short-run labor share at the individual level. In periods when labor market tightness
is high, so is the labor share; the number of new employer-employee matches is on
the other hand negatively related to the labor share.
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Another important group of labor market variables is consituted by our two sec-
toral human capital measures, taken from EU KLEMS, that is the share of high- and
medium-skilled remuneration in the total wage bill (low-skilled remuneration taken
as reference category). We ﬁnd that both these shares are associated with lower la-
bor shares in value added, corroborating the capital–skill complementarity hypothesis
(Krusell et al., 2000): wherever a newer, more capital-intensive vintage of machines
is employed, its usage requires the ﬁrms to hire suﬃciently skilled workers to operate
it, but then these machines become a more eﬃcient substitute for low-skilled labor.
In result, the share of high-skilled labor pay is negatively correlated with the labor
share, even when controlling for a number of auxiliary variables. So is the share of
medium-skilled labor pay. These ﬁndings suggest that human capital variables can
have an impact on the labor share which is (at least partially) independent of labor
market characteristics, ﬁrm demographics, and market structures. As shown in the
Appendix, this result is however not robust to the inclusion of autocorrelated distur-
bances. We ﬁnd that whereas in the cross-section, ﬁrms in sectors with higher shares
of high- and medium-skilled remuneration have on average lower labor shares, upward
shifts in the share of high- and medium-skilled remuneration are expected to raise
the labor share rather than decrease it. See the Appendix for more details.
The signs of coeﬃcients on control variables are in agreement with intuition and
other empirical evidence, just like in the previous subsection. Some of them will be
discussed later on in the paper.
4.3 Market structures
We can now turn to the impact of market structures on the labor share. Our variables
of interest now are trade openness (export revenues as a share in total revenues), tax
wedge on labor, and the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index, measuring concentration in
each 2-digit industry.
As shown in Table 7, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level export orientation is robustly pos-
itively related to its labor share in value added. Even though the impact is very
modest, it is important to note that this direction of relationship runs contrary to our
prior expectations, according to which exporters should generally use more eﬃcient,
more capital-intensive technologies. The counterintuitive result is most likely a conse-
quence of two facts. First, in the Polish data we see essentially no correlation between
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average labor shares and average export revenue shares across sectors (Figure 7). Sec-
ond, the period of the dramatic drop in the labor share (2001–04) was proceeded by
a marked fall in foreign demand (due to the Russian crisis), which in turn decreased
export shares in a large fraction of ﬁrms. The latter point is particularly important
because the parameters in our equations have been identiﬁed by running ﬁxed eﬀects
regressions.
Scarce signs of partial correctness of the prior (opposite) hypothesis could never-
theless be found in regression [5] where we included the sector-speciﬁc average of our
trade openness measure as well as its cross-time average (i.e., a sector-speciﬁc eﬀect).
In such case, the coeﬃcient on sector-speciﬁc, as opposed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc, trade open-
ness becomes negative, signiﬁcant and higher in absolute value than the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
one. This eﬀect might be spurious, though: addition of further conditioning variables
overturns this result.
We also ﬁnd that tax wedge on labor is negatively related to the labor share,
in line with our prior expectations, but this relationship is weak and not robust to
certain choices of conditioning variables.
As far as market concentration is concerned, it is shown to have a positive impact
on the labor share, so that more concentrated industries have higher labor shares on
average. This is in line with intuition since such industries are dominated by large
ﬁrms which are usually highly unionized, and so the power of workers to bargain
higher wages should be high as well. Given this context, our further result might
turn out quite puzzling: we also ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the cross-time average
of each sector’s Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index is negative and signiﬁcant, and larger in
magnitude than the positive coeﬃcient of the time-speciﬁc value of this index. One
interpretation could be that an increase in competitiveness (fall in concentration)
should be associated with a consecutive fall in the labor share, but that the cross-
section relationship works in the opposite direction. Within a given sector, in periods
when competitiveness is high, the labor share should be markedly lower than in
periods when competitiveness is low, but this eﬀect does not work across sectors.
4.4 Control variables
Finally, we should also comment on the results obtained for our conditioning variables,
included in numerous regressions in Tables 5, 6 and 7. The signs of relevant coeﬃcients
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Table 7: The impact of market structures on the labor share.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare
quarter 1 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0246*** 0.0224*** 0.0225*** 0.0321***
(0.000502) (0.000502) (0.000502) (0.000502) (0.000504) (0.000520) (0.000520) (0.000720)
quarter 2 0.00869*** 0.00869*** 0.00868*** 0.00872*** 0.00881*** 0.0432*** 0.0358*** 0.0420***
(0.000493) (0.000493) (0.000493) (0.000493) (0.000494) (0.000713) (0.000812) (0.00106)
quarter 3 0.00407*** 0.00407*** 0.00405*** 0.00409*** 0.00413*** 0.0238*** 0.0188*** 0.0226***
(0.000491) (0.000491) (0.000491) (0.000491) (0.000491) (0.000592) (0.000647) (0.000843)
trade openness 0.00121** 0.00119** 0.00116** 0.00139** 0.00145** 0.00178*** 0.00181*** 0.000872
(0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000573) (0.000573) (0.000625)
labor wedge -0.000518 -0.000515 -0.000725 -0.00221** -0.00239** -0.00292*** -0.00542*** 0.000210
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00169)
herﬁndahl 0.0400*** 0.0384*** 0.0328*** 0.0293*** 0.0387*** 0.0164** 0.00716 0.0291**
(0.00608) (0.00609) (0.00609) (0.00610) (0.00644) (0.00721) (0.00724) (0.0119)
mining sector 0.0303*** 0.0184** 0.0153* 0.0234*** 0.0158* 0.00513 -0.0124
(0.00866) (0.00867) (0.00867) (0.00880) (0.00905) (0.00908) (0.0147)
manufacturing sector 0.00698*** 0.00650*** 0.00656*** 0.00397* 0.00299 -0.0146*** -0.0311***
(0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00222) (0.00229) (0.00248) (0.00354)
ﬁrm size 3.78e-06*** 3.67e-06*** 3.68e-06*** 3.91e-06*** 3.82e-06*** 3.96e-06***
(1.66e-07) (1.66e-07) (1.66e-07) (1.80e-07) (1.80e-07) (2.33e-07)
treasury owned 0.0283*** 0.0280*** 0.0339*** 0.0327*** 0.0412***
(0.00184) (0.00185) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00355)
state owned 0.0244*** 0.0240*** 0.0257*** 0.0227*** 0.0285***
(0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00338)
commune owned 0.0450*** 0.0449*** 0.0393*** 0.0369*** 0.0661***
(0.00436) (0.00436) (0.00465) (0.00465) (0.00726)
foreign owned -0.0225*** -0.0224*** -0.0201*** -0.0193*** -0.0183***
(0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00251)
donations/VA 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0210*** 0.0212*** 0.0528***
(0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00248) (0.00248) (0.00436)
trade openness (sector) -0.00716*** 0.0231*** 0.0311*** 0.0271***
(0.00265) (0.00276) (0.00279) (0.00365)
trade op. (ﬁxed, sector) 0.0269*** -0.00382 0.000146 0.0102
(0.00779) (0.00807) (0.00810) (0.0109)
herﬁndahl (ﬁxed) -0.102*** -0.0731*** -0.0524*** -0.0624**
(0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0272)
tightness 0.0193*** 0.00960*** 0.0135***
(0.000829) (0.000976) (0.00146)
matches -0.000940*** -0.000774*** -0.000734***
(1.44e-05) (1.68e-05) (2.35e-05)
medium skilled -0.00286*** -0.00450***
(0.000268) (0.000414)








Constant 0.646*** 0.642*** 0.641*** 0.639*** 0.640*** 0.710*** 0.990*** 1.112***
(0.000472) (0.00128) (0.00128) (0.00135) (0.00148) (0.00203) (0.0245) (0.0382)
Observations 659559 659559 659559 659559 659559 616958 616958 378562
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.015 0.015 0.016
Number of idn 35270 35270 35270 35270 35270 33752 33752 24440
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are in line with our prior expectations, based on earlier literature.
• Firm size is robustly positively correlated with labor share: larger ﬁrms have a
larger labor share.
• The proportion of received donations to value added is robustly positively cor-
related with labor share: ﬁrm which obtain relatively more donations also have
higher labor shares. This agrees with the interpretation that in Poland, dona-
tions are usually directed to ﬁrms which use outdated, labor-intensive technolo-
gies, and have hard time surviving in competitive markets.
• Ownership still plays an important role in Poland: state-owned, treasury-owned,
and commune-owned companies record signiﬁcantly higher labor shares than
private enterprises, whereas domestic private enterprises record signiﬁcantly
higher labor shares than foreign ones. This could be due to the fact that private
and foreign ﬁrms are less unionized and have a better bargaining position in the
wage-setting process.
• There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in labor shares between mining, manufacturing,
and services. We included the mining and manufacturing sector dummies in our
regressions, keeping the service sector as our reference category. We obtain two
results. Firstly, labor share is generally larger in mining than in services, but
the dummy becomes insigniﬁcant when one includes human capital variables
into the regression. This means that most of this diﬀerence could be captured
by the diﬀerences in skill-intensity between mining and services. Secondly, labor
share seems larger in manufacturing than in services in the whole sample, but
it then becomes insigniﬁcant once labor market tightness and new matches are
included in the regression, and ﬁnally it becomes decidedly negative when one
also adds human capital variables. Hence, the apparent result of labor share
being higher in manufacturing than in services is explained by labor market
characteristics and human capital variables in more than 100%.
• There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the labor share across quarters of the year.
We took quarter 4 (October–December) as our reference category, and included
dummies for all three other quarters in the regressions. We ﬁnd that labor share
is signiﬁcantly higher in ﬁrst quarters than in fourth quarters of the year, in all
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regression speciﬁcations. The same applies – roughly speaking – to second and
third quarters as well, but in those cases the result is not robust to including
lagged labor market characteristics in the regressions.
5 Conclusion
In the current paper, we have analyzed the ﬁrm-level determinants of the labor share.
The objective of the paper was to identify, using our unique quarterly ﬁrm-level panel
dataset from the Polish enterprise sector in 1995–2008, which economic variables are
responsible for the short-run dynamics of the labor share. This task is complementary
to the one undertaken in Growiec (2009), where the aggregate shift in the labor
share in Poland has been decomposed into contributions attributable to inter-sectoral
reallocation of production, asymmetric changes in wages, and intra-sectoral shifts in
the labor share. The results of that study indicated that around 44% of the total
shift in labor share could be attributed to inter-sectoral reallocation, but almost no
variance could.
Here we scrutinize the intra-sectoral shifts in more detail, identifying the impacts of
changes in general labor market characteristics, ﬁrm demographics, market structures,
and human capital variables. Our dataset enables us to draw precise conclusions on
the relative importance of particular variables in explaining the variability of labor
shares across ﬁrms and time.
We conclude that while sector-speciﬁc factors and changes in the ownership struc-
ture explain a large fraction of the observed downward trend in the labor share, labor
market characteristics and ﬁrm demographics are robust correlates of labor share
changes at high frequency. Our results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies
in the regressions beside ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and to allowing for autocorrelation of the
disturbance term. They are therefore not driven by cross-correlations across the busi-
ness cycle, nor are they artifacts of the construction of our dataset. Instead, we can
conﬁdently claim that we have identiﬁed genuine determinants of the labor share
across enterprises.
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Appendix. Robustness checks
Results of the regressions presented in the main text could be questioned on the
premises of possible omitted variables and endogeneity biases. To ascertain that our
crucial ﬁndings are not driven by spurious eﬀects, we have therefore run a series of
robustness checks. The results of these checks are presented below.
A.1 Including time dummies
Our ﬁrst robustness check consists in including time dummies in the regressions. By
doing so, we eliminate the impact of business-cycle correlations on the labor share.
Since we also control for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects, we remain only with the genuine
impacts of variables with both cross-sectional and intertemporal variability. We are
thus unable to account for the impacts of labor market tightness and new employer-
employee matches on the labor share, as these variables are available only as time
series.
Results of this robustness check are presented in Table 8. In this table, we redo the
series of regressions focused on ﬁrm demographics, but this time with time dummies.
As compared to Table 5, we notice the following important diﬀerence: the sign of
the coeﬃcient on ﬁrm age has changed from negative to positive. It is now found
that controlling for pure time eﬀects, ﬁrm age aﬀects the labor share positively. This
holds true even when ﬁrm size is controlled for as well. We conclude that the apparent
negative result presented in the main table might be spurious and primarily due to
the simultaneous decline in the labor share and rise in average ﬁrm age in our dataset.
The latter regularity is due to the fact that we had no information on the age of ﬁrms
present our data already in the ﬁrst quarter of 1995, and thus we had to exclude them
from our data.
Other results presented in Table 5 are robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
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Table 8: The impact of ﬁrm demographics, market structures and ownership on the
labor share. Regressions including both ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare
ﬁrm age 0.00207*** 0.00204*** 0.00204*** 0.00201*** 0.00261***
(0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000120)
quitter 0.000969 0.000960 0.000968 0.000922 0.00433***
(0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00143)
entrant -0.00393*** -0.00376*** -0.00376*** -0.00351*** -0.00220*
(0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00115)
ﬁrm size 3.81e-06*** 3.83e-06*** 3.85e-06*** 3.65e-06***
(2.12e-07) (2.12e-07) (2.12e-07) (2.08e-07)
mining sector 0.0217 0.0186 0.0136
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0145)
manufacturing sector -0.000171 -0.000747 -0.00323
(0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00295)
herﬁndahl (ﬁxed) -0.0865*** -0.0928*** -0.0907***
(0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0268)
trade op. (ﬁxed, sector) 0.0119 0.0132 -0.0128
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0107)
treasury owned 0.0411*** 0.0385***
(0.00348) (0.00341)
state owned 0.0302*** 0.0269***
(0.00340) (0.00332)
commune owned 0.0664*** 0.0630***
(0.00725) (0.00708)












Constant 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.550*** 0.549*** 0.528***
(0.00430) (0.00430) (0.00469) (0.00472) (0.00464)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 386847 386847 386847 386847 385591
R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.021
Number of idn 24998 24998 24998 24998 24920
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare
ﬁrm age 0.00207*** 0.00204*** 0.00204*** 0.00201*** 0.00261***
(0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000120)
quitter 0.000969 0.000960 0.000968 0.000922 0.00433***
(0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00143)
entrant -0.00393*** -0.00376*** -0.00376*** -0.00351*** -0.00220*
(0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00115)
ﬁrm size 3.81e-06*** 3.83e-06*** 3.85e-06*** 3.65e-06***
(2.12e-07) (2.12e-07) (2.12e-07) (2.08e-07)
mining sector 0.0217 0.0186 0.0136
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0145)
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treasury owned 0.0411*** 0.0385***
(0.00348) (0.00341)
state owned 0.0302*** 0.0269***
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commune owned 0.0664*** 0.0630***
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Constant 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.550*** 0.549*** 0.528***
(0.00430) (0.00430) (0.00469) (0.00472) (0.00464)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 386847 386847 386847 386847 385591
R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.021
Number of idn 24998 24998 24998 24998 24920
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A.2 Allowing for autocorrelated residuals
Another robustness check for our results involves allowing the residuals of our panel
regressions to be autocorrelated. Indeed, numerous mechanisms depicted in the anal-
yses could be inherently persistent. This applies in particular to the labor share
process itself – employment and wages are indeed frequently found in the literature
to be sticky and to adjust to changing economic environments only with a lag. Hence,
omitting the possibility of autocorrelation in residuals makes our estimates susceptible
to inconsistency.
Table 9 documents that when residuals are allowed to have an AR(1) structure,
their autocorrelation coeﬃcient is estimated to be around 0.152–0.154 and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 1% conﬁdence level. This change does not, however, overturn the
principal results obtained in Tables 5–7.
Table 9 is a revised version of Table 6. The only diﬀerence is that we have
now allowed our exogenous disturbances to be AR(1). There are two important
diﬀerences between the results reported in these two tables. First, the coeﬃcients
in Table 9 are generally more precisely estimated and thus more often statistically
signiﬁcant. Secondly, and more importantly, the signs on the shares of high-skilled
and medium-skilled remuneration have now reversed from negative to positive. By
including time-series autocorrelation into our analysis, we can therefore conclude that
whereas in the cross-section, ﬁrms in sectors with higher shares of high- and medium-
skilled remuneration have on average lower labor shares, upward shifts in the share
of high- and medium-skilled remuneration are expected to raise the labor share, not
decrease it.
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A.3 Including the ratio of capital assets to value added
Another important robustness check of our principal results is to include the ratio
of capital assets to value added in our regressions. We have not done this in our
main analyses because: (i) the F-01 dataset has information on ﬁrms’ capital stocks
only from 2002 onwards, and (ii) the reliability of the capital data is somewhat lower
than of other data in the set. The ﬁrst limitation reduces our dataset to about
one third, while the requirement that capital stocks be positive and less than 10,000
times the ﬁrms’ value added, reduces the dataset by a few further tens of thousands
of observations.
To check the validity of our main results, we have nevertheless re-run the regres-
sions from Table 7 on the reduced dataset, including the capital to value added (K/Y )
ratio as an additional conditioning variable. The results are contained in Table 10.
We see there that in our data, the K/Y ratio is robustly positively related to the
ﬁrm-level labor share. This stands in sharp contrast to the negative coeﬃcient ob-
tained by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) for one- and two-digit industry-level data
from 12 OECD countries in the period 1970–95, in a log–log speciﬁcation.
Other coeﬃcients are however little aﬀected by the inclusion of the K/Y ratio,
which corroborates their robustness. Some coeﬃcients are somewhat less precisely
estimated now, due to a marked reduction of the size of our dataset, but their signs
are generally robust. Comparing Table 7 to Table 10, we also see that the coeﬃcient
on the Herﬁndahl index has become much larger after the inclusion of the K/Y ratio,
indicating that these two variables might be strongly interrelated. Trade openness and
the labor tax wedge have, in turn, become much less important for the determination
of the labor share and are now generally insigniﬁcant (but have the same sign).
One interesting exception is that after controlling for the K/Y ratio, entrants have
above-average, and not below-average, labor shares. This discrepancy in our results is
driven by the large diﬀerences in capital intensity between these two groups of ﬁrms:
entrants in our dataset have (on average) almost twice as high capital intensities as
incumbent ﬁrms.
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Table 10: The impact of labor market characteristics, ﬁrm demographics, market
structures and ownership on the labor share. Regressions with an explicit inclusion
of the ratio of capital assets to value added.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare laborshare
quarter 1 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0152*** 0.0154*** 0.0155*** 0.0134*** 0.0141*** 0.0215***
(0.000865) (0.000865) (0.000865) (0.000865) (0.000869) (0.000871) (0.000876) (0.00112)
quarter 2 0.00183* 0.00184* 0.00185* 0.00199** 0.00221** 0.0219*** 0.0191*** 0.0248***
(0.000992) (0.000992) (0.000992) (0.000992) (0.000993) (0.00134) (0.00140) (0.00169)
quarter 3 0.000400 0.000413 0.000398 0.000489 0.000773 0.0113*** 0.00910*** 0.0134***
(0.000991) (0.000991) (0.000991) (0.000991) (0.000991) (0.00107) (0.00111) (0.00149)
trade openness 0.00290 0.00284 0.00255 0.00261 0.00237 0.00398* 0.00409* 0.00447
(0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00272)
labor wedge -0.000773 -0.000788 -0.000887 -0.00134 -0.00141 -0.00281 -0.00276 0.0323***
(0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00673)
herﬁndahl 0.225*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.216*** 0.322*** 0.259*** 0.253*** 0.268***
(0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0316)
K/Y ratio 0.000326*** 0.000326*** 0.000328*** 0.000327*** 0.000328*** 0.000323*** 0.000324*** 0.000383***
(2.02e-05) (2.02e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.64e-05)
mining sector -0.0285 -0.0441** -0.0405** 0.00184 -0.00349 -0.0193 -0.0356
(0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0297)
manufacturing sector 0.00865** 0.00798* 0.00810** 0.00611 0.00648 -0.0123** -0.0201***
(0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00471) (0.00471) (0.00534) (0.00661)
ﬁrm size 1.15e-05*** 1.14e-05*** 1.13e-05*** 1.17e-05*** 1.16e-05*** 1.64e-05***
(1.18e-06) (1.18e-06) (1.18e-06) (1.18e-06) (1.18e-06) (2.07e-06)
treasury owned 0.0221*** 0.0225*** 0.0170*** 0.0166*** 0.0299***
(0.00601) (0.00601) (0.00601) (0.00601) (0.00966)
state owned 0.0290*** 0.0282*** 0.0218*** 0.0214*** 0.0243***
(0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00726)
commune owned 0.0512*** 0.0518*** 0.0472*** 0.0478*** 0.0768***
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0150)
foreign owned -0.00951** -0.00926** -0.00731* -0.00724* -0.00708
(0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00378) (0.00378) (0.00467)
donations/VA 0.0672*** 0.0663*** 0.0673*** 0.0674*** 0.0893***
(0.00692) (0.00692) (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00883)
trade openness (sector) 0.00418 0.0256*** 0.0268*** 0.0245***
(0.00503) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00605)
trade op. (ﬁxed, sector) 0.0214 -0.00207 0.00839 0.00536
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0205)
herﬁndahl (ﬁxed) -0.354*** -0.299*** -0.282*** -0.264***
(0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0501)
tightness 0.0277*** 0.0156*** 0.0380***
(0.00175) (0.00240) (0.00762)
matches -0.000544*** -0.000491*** -0.000429***
(2.91e-05) (3.00e-05) (5.01e-05)
medium skilled -0.00278*** -0.00265***
(0.000600) (0.000769)








Constant 0.602*** 0.597*** 0.594*** 0.590*** 0.595*** 0.635*** 0.924*** 0.861***
(0.00126) (0.00275) (0.00276) (0.00292) (0.00320) (0.00435) (0.0569) (0.0720)
Observations 201575 201575 201575 201575 201575 201575 201575 146462
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.014
Number of idn 22754 22754 22754 22754 22754 22754 22754 17698
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A.3 Including the ratio of capital assets to value added
Another important robustness check of our principal results is to include the ratio
of capital assets to value added in our regressions. We have not done this in our
main analyses because: (i) the F-01 dataset has information on ﬁrms’ capital stocks
only from 2002 onwards, and (ii) the reliability of the capital data is somewhat lower
than of other data in the set. The ﬁrst limitation reduces our dataset to about
one third, while the requirement that capital stocks be positive and less than 10,000
times the ﬁrms’ value added, reduces the dataset by a few further tens of thousands
of observations.
To check the validity of our main results, we have nevertheless re-run the regres-
sions from Table 7 on the reduced dataset, including the capital to value added (K/Y )
ratio as an additional conditioning variable. The results are contained in Table 10.
We see there that in our data, the K/Y ratio is robustly positively related to the
ﬁrm-level labor share. This stands in sharp contrast to the negative coeﬃcient ob-
tained by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) for one- and two-digit industry-level data
from 12 OECD countries in the period 1970–95, in a log–log speciﬁcation.
Other coeﬃcients are however little aﬀected by the inclusion of the K/Y ratio,
which corroborates their robustness. Some coeﬃcients are somewhat less precisely
estimated now, due to a marked reduction of the size of our dataset, but their signs
are generally robust. Comparing Table 7 to Table 10, we also see that the coeﬃcient
on the Herﬁndahl index has become much larger after the inclusion of the K/Y ratio,
indicating that these two variables might be strongly interrelated. Trade openness and
the labor tax wedge have, in turn, become much less important for the determination
of the labor share and are now generally insigniﬁcant (but have the same sign).
One interesting exception is that after controlling for the K/Y ratio, entrants have
above-average, and not below-average, labor shares. This discrepancy in our results is
driven by the large diﬀerences in capital intensity between these two groups of ﬁrms:
entrants in our dataset have (on average) almost twice as high capital intensities as
incumbent ﬁrms.
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